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Abstract
In the wake of growing awareness, decision makers anticipate that they might ac-
quire knowledge that, in their current state of ignorance, is unimaginable. Supposedly,
this anticipation manifests itself in the decision makers’ choice behavior. In this paper
we model the anticipation of growing awareness, lay choice-based axiomatic founda-
tions to a subjective expected utility representation of beliefs about the likelihood of
discovering unknown consequences, and assign utility to consequences that are not
only unimaginable but may also be nonexistent. In so doing, we maintain the flavor of
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1 Introduction
Whether by chance or by design, actions and scientific experiments sometimes result in
consequences that, prior to their discovery, were unimaginable or, for lack of appropriate
language, indescribable. Examples include the discovery of HIV and the discovery of the
structure of DNA. Habituation to such consequences is an important aspect of human
experience, and the anticipation of additional such discoveries shapes our future outlook,
manifesting itself in our choice behavior.
In this paper, which builds on Karni and Vierø (2013, 2015), we propose a choice-based
theory that captures a decision maker’s anticipation of becoming aware of consequences
that she is currently unaware of and analyze its behavioral implications. Our presumptions
are that although a decision maker cannot know what it is that she does not know, she
can entertain the belief that there are unimaginable aspects of the universe yet to be
discovered, and that this belief manifests itself in her choice behavior. Because we adhere
to the revealed preference methodology, we require that the decision maker’s choice set
consists only of objects that are well-defined given her level of awareness. In other words,
when uncertainty resolves, it must be possible to meaningfully settle any bet or trade that
the decision maker may have engaged in.
The main thrust of Karni and Vierø (2013, 2015) is the evolution of decision makers’
beliefs as they become aware of new acts, consequences, and the links among them. In
these models, however, decision makers can be interpreted as being myopic, believing
themselves, at every stage, to be fully aware of the scope of their universe. Formally, in these
models, decision makers act as if they consider the state space that resolves the uncertainty
associated with the feasible courses of action and consequences of which they are aware,
to be a sure event. Consequently, even though it happened before, decision makers fail to
anticipate the possibility of discoveries that would require expansions of the state space.
In a major break with our earlier work, this paper extends the analytical framework to
incorporate decision makers’ awareness of their potential ignorance, and the anticipation
that actions may reveal consequences that were unspecified in the original formulation of
the decision problem. The resulting state space is partitioned into a set of fully describable
states and a set of states that are only partially describable or nondescribable. By contrast,
in our earlier work the state space consisted solely of fully describable states. We discuss
this issue in further details in section 2.1, following the construction of the state space, and
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again in section 3.1, where we illustrate how the predictions of choice behavior of the two
models might differ.
This work also departs from the analytical framework we employed before in a dif-
ferent respect. Specifically, in Karni and Vierø (2013, 2015) the state space, constructed
from finite sets of feasible acts and consequences, is finite, and the choice set consisted
of conceivable Anscombe-Aumann (1963) acts, (that is, mappings from the state space to
the set of lotteries on the feasible consequences). This formulation is based on the tacit
assumption that the decision maker can conceive of acts whose state-contingent payoffs are
lotteries on the set of feasible consequences. While analytically convenient, this construc-
tion is not entirely satisfactory. If lotteries on feasible consequences instead of the feasible
consequences themselves are used to construct the state space then, by construction, the
state space is infinite. This would complicate the analysis. To avoid the aforementioned
inconsistency and, at the same time, to maintain the finiteness of the state space, in this
work we redefine conceivable acts to be functions from states to feasible consequences. We
then assume that decision makers can imagine choosing among conceivable acts randomly.
Hence, the choice space is the set of probability distributions over the conceivable acts,
dubbed mixed conceivable acts.
Within the new analytical framework we develop an axiomatic model of choice under
uncertainty and analyze the behavioral implications of a decision maker’s awareness of her
unawareness. The sense that there might be consequences, lurking in the background, of
which one is unaware may inspire fear or excitement, thereby affecting individual choice
behavior. Our model assigns utility to the unknown consequences, thereby capturing the
decision maker’s attitude toward the discovery of unknown, or indescribable, consequences
and the emotions it evokes. For instance, if the predominant emotion evoked by the
unknown is fear, then confidence that one is unlikely to encounter unknown consequences
would beget boldness of action while the lack of it would induce more prudent behavior.
To represent the attitude toward unawareness, we need to enrich the framework of Karni
and Vierø (2013, 2015). In particular, because we require that bets should be possible to
settle once uncertainty resolves, decision makers cannot meaningfully form preferences
over acts that assign indescribable consequences to fully describable states. Therefore, to
represent the attitudes toward indescribable consequences, we expand the set of conceivable
acts to include acts that assign, to partially describable states only, consequences that will
be discovered if these states obtain. The resulting model is a generalization of subjective
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expected utility with an extra parameter that captures the decision maker’s “utility of the
unknown.” Comparing two decision makers, the one with the higher value of this utility
of the unknown exhibits excitement, or optimism, toward the unknown, relative to the
decision maker with the lower value, which reflects fear, or pessimism. The representation
thus allows us to explicitly and formally express this attitude toward the unknown.
Another main thrust of this work is the analysis of the evolution of the decision maker’s
beliefs about her ignorance in the wake of the discovery of new consequences. We show
that, with respect to such discoveries, the model of reverse Bayesian updating of Karni
and Vierø (2013) is a special case of the present one. Furthermore, depending on the
nature of the discoveries, the sense of ignorance, or the ‘residual’ unawareness, may shrink,
grow, or remain unchanged. For instance, as unsuspected regions of the Earth or the solar
system were discovered, fewer regions remained to be explored, and the sense of ignorance
diminished. By contrast, some scientific discoveries, such as atoms or the structure of the
DNA, resolved certain outstanding issues in physics and biology and, at the same time,
opened up new vistas. These discoveries enhanced the sense that our ignorance is, in fact,
greater than what was previously believed. Our model is designed to accommodate all the
aforementioned possibilities of evolution of the sense of ignorance.
On a more mundane level, decision makers are routinely confronted with the need to
make decisions in specific situations. For example, a decision maker about to embark on
a trip must choose a means of transportation to get from here to there, or, following a
diagnosis of illness, a decision maker must decide which treatment to seek. It is natural to
approach such decisions by identifying the relevant courses of action and the outcomes that
these actions may produce. It might happen, however, that due to lack of imagination or
insufficient attention, the chosen course of action results in an outcome that the decision
maker has failed to consider. Therefore, when facing a specific decision, a decision maker
worries that she might fail to take into account all the relevant outcomes. The awareness
that an outcome that should have been considered is, inadvertently, neglected, bears re-
semblance to awareness of unawareness and it similarly affects individual choice behavior.
We discuss this similarity between awareness of unawareness and “small worlds” in further
detail in the concluding remarks.
In the next section we present the analytical framework. In section 3, we present a
subjective expected utility theory that captures the anticipated discovery of indescribable
consequences. In section 4, we introduce additional axioms linking distinct levels of un-
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awareness and a representation theorem that captures the evolution of a decision maker’s
beliefs in the wake of new discoveries. In section 5, we discuss a number of points, includ-
ing small worlds, the evolution of beliefs, the behavioral manifestations of awareness of
unawareness, the implications of applying our approach to defining “unknown unknowns”
to the standard subjective expected utility models, and the related literature. The proofs
are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Analytical Framework
In Karni and Vierø (2013, 2015), we modeled and analyzed the evolution of a decision
maker’s beliefs when her universe, formalized as a state space, expands in the wake of
discoveries of new actions and/or consequences.1 In this work, our investigation focuses on
the effects of anticipating the discovery of unexpected consequences on a decision maker’s
choice behavior, and on the evolution of her beliefs and her sense of ignorance following
such discoveries. In view of the differences in both the nature of the discoveries and the
evolution of the state space, we leave the investigation of the anticipation of discovery of
new feasible actions for future work.
The prospect of discovering consequences which the decision maker is unaware of and
the sentiments, such as fear or excitement, that it evokes, presumably affects her choice
behavior. Our first goal is to obtain a representation of preferences that assigns utility to
unspecified consequences that may not even exist. The utility of unimaginable consequences
represents the decision maker’s emotions evoked by the prospect of their discovery.
2.1 Conceivable states and the objects of choice
Let A be a finite, nonempty, set of basic actions with generic element a, and C be a
finite, nonempty, set of feasible consequences with generic element c. The elements of
C are consequences that the decision maker is aware of. The key innovation compared
to Karni and Vierø (2013, 2015) is that the decision maker may also entertain the idea
that there might be consequences, of which she is unaware, that are unimaginable. We
define x = ¬C to be the abstract “consequence” that has the interpretation “none of the
1The state space evolves differently depending on whether a new action or a new consequence is discov-
ered. For details, see Karni and Vierø (2013).
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above.” There may, in fact, be one consequence, any finite number, or an infinite number
of consequences that the decision maker is unaware of, or no such consequence at all. The
abstract consequence x captures all of these possibilities.2 Ex ante, the decision maker
cannot know which of these is true.3 Let Cˆ = C ∪ {x}, which we will refer to as the
set of extended consequences, with generic element cˆ. Together these sets determine the
augmented conceivable state space, defined as
CˆA := {s : A→ Cˆ}.
That is, the augmented conceivable state space is the set of all functions from A to Cˆ
and is, by definition, exhaustive.4 The sets A and C also determine the subset of fully
describable conceivable states, CA := {s : A→ C}.
To illustrate, consider the following situation: there are two different medications,
designed to treat the same health problem, that must be taken regularly. For simplicity
suppose that each medication can lead to one of two known outcomes, success and failure
(e.g., reducing the cholesterol level below a target threshold). Suppose that one of the
medications has been used for some time, while the second medication was just approved
but tests show it to be more effective. Each of the medications might have long-term,
unforeseen, side effects that will not be known for some time. We can describe the situation
as follows: Corresponding to the two medications there are two basic actions, A = {a1, a2},
and corresponding to the two known possible outcomes there are two feasible consequences,
C = {c1, c2}. The unknown possible side-effects are denoted by x. The resulting augmented
conceivable state space consists of nine states as depicted in the following matrix:
2In section 4 we discuss the evolution of the decision maker’s beliefs about the likelihood of the sets of
partially-describable and nondescribable states. These beliefs are represented by a subjective probability
distribution representing how likely the decision maker finds it that consequences she is currently unaware
of will be discovered. One interpretation of this likelihood is that it reflects the decision maker’s beliefs
about the size of the set of consequences of which she is unaware.
3Machina (2003) mentions the possibility of capturing the anticipation of the unexpected by specifying
a catch-all state, with a label like “none of the above.” Unlike our approach, according to which “none of
the above” refers to unspecified consequences, Machina applies the term to unspecified states.
4This method of constructing the state space from the primitive sets of feasible acts and consequences
appears in Schmeidler and Wakker (1987) and Karni and Schmeidler (1991). It was used in Karni and Vierø
(2013, 2015). The idea was also discussed in the philosophical literature (see Stalnaker [1972], Gibbard
and Harper [1978]). The augmentation due to “none of the above” is specific to the present paper.
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A \ S s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
a1 c1 c2 c1 c2 x x c1 c2 x
a2 c1 c1 c2 c2 c1 c2 x x x
(1)
The subset of fully describable conceivable states in this example is CA = {s1, ..., s4}.
The situation described in this example can be used to highlight the difference between
the present model and the model of Karni and Vierø (2013). In our earlier work there is
no analogue of x. Thus, the only consequences that the decision maker can conceive of are
c1 and c2. Therefore, the state space that represents her conception of the world consists
of the subset of fully describable states (in this example that is CA = {s1, ..., s4}). In other
words, despite her past experience, which includes discoveries of consequences of which
she was unaware, the decision maker believes that her current conception of the universe
is complete and fully describable. The model excludes the analysis of choice behavior
of decision makers who, having repeatedly learned that their conception of the possible
consequences of their actions was incomplete, anticipate future discoveries of inconceivable
consequences. In section 3.1 below we pursue this comparison and show that the two
models might yield opposite predictions.
Define the set of conceivable acts, F , to be the set of all the mappings from the aug-
mented conceivable state space to the set of feasible consequences.5 Formally,
F := {f : CˆA → C}. (2)
Because conceivable acts are functions whose domain is the state space, adding them to
the list of acts does not require further expansion of the state space. In other words, once
the state is known, all uncertainty regarding the outcome of a conceivable act is resolved
and no new states are created. By contrast, if a new basic action is either designed or
discovered then, by definition, it assigns all the consequences to each state in CˆA. Thus,
each state in CˆA becomes an event in the newly defined state space. Consider the example
in which there are two basic actions and two feasible consequences. If a new basic action is
discovered, the state (ci, cj) becomes the event {(ci, cj , c1) , (ci, cj , c2) , (ci, cj , x)}, i, j = 1, 2.
5Note that the definition of conceivable acts in the present paper differs from the definition of conceivable
acts in Karni and Vierø (2013, 2015). In our previous work, conceivable acts were functions from conceivable
states to lotteries over consequences (i.e., Anscombe-Aumann (1963) acts). For the reasons discussed in
the introduction, the approach taken here is more satisfactory.
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That is, because the payoff of the new basic action in this prior state can be c1, c2 , or x, a
new basic action means that the prior state (ci, cj) no longer resolves the uncertainty. By
contrast, the states (ci, cj) , i, j = 1, 2, completely resolves the uncertainty regarding the
payoff of the new conceivable acts.6
By definition, the payoffs of the conceivable acts are restricted to feasible consequences
(that is, their range does not include x). Because we adhere to the revealed preference
methodology, we require that, for a given level of awareness, acts must be meaningfully
described and their consequences effectuated once the uncertainty is resolved. Thus, if one
must be able to effectuate the consequences specified by conceivable acts once uncertainty
is resolved, then the specification in (2) is the most general possible. Including the abstract
consequence “none of the above,” or x, in the range of the conceivable acts would create
a conceptual problem in fully describable states (e.g., the states s1, ..., s4 in the example
in matrix (1)). In these states, x remains abstract, so a conceivable act that pays off x
cannot be settled in those states and is, therefore, meaningless. While the decision maker
could potentially describe such acts (as we just did), it is too farfetched to suppose that
she could express preferences over them. Since the range of the basic actions includes x,
the set F of conceivable acts does not include the basic actions.
The argument in the preceding paragraph only applies if we restrict the set of acts to
maps whose range is the same set of consequences in all states. Without this restriction,
we can expand the set of acts that preferences can meaningfully be expressed over. In
particular, in states whose partial or complete descriptions include x, this abstract con-
sequence takes a concrete meaning ex post, and conceivable acts that pay off x in one or
more of these states can be settled. In the above example, with the state space depicted
in (1), an act that assigns a consequence, which is neither c1 nor c2 and which will be
discovered in the event {s5, ..., s9}, to one or more of the states s5, . . . , s9, is well-defined.
In other words, the decision maker can promise to deliver a newly discovered consequence,
whatever it may be, if such a consequence is discovered, and she will be able to keep her
promise if such a discovery is made.
To explore the possibility of assigning utility to unknown consequences, x, we extend
the set of acts by adding functions whose range includes x as a possible payoff in the
imperfectly describable states CˆA \CA. Formally, we define the set of extended conceivable
6For more detailed discussion of the implications of discovering new basic actions, see Karni and Vierø
(2013).
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Figure 1: Illustration of the set of extended conceivable acts
-
6
s
cˆ
s10 s2 s3 s4︸ ︷︷ ︸
CA
x
{
C

︸ ︷︷ ︸bCA\CA
Ĉ

s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
acts F ∗ as follows:
F ∗ := {f∗ : CˆA → Cˆ | f∗−1(x) ⊆ CˆA \ CA}. (3)
By definition, the consequences of extended conceivable acts are restricted to elements of C
in the fully describable states, but can be any element of Cˆ, including x, in the imperfectly
describable states. A schematic illustration in the context of the example in matrix (1) is
given in Figure 1. The range of the extended conceivable acts is C in {s1, . . . , s4}, and Cˆ
in {s5, . . . , s9}.
Note that the set, A, of basic actions, and the set, F , of conceivable acts are (disjoint)
subsets of the set of extended conceivable acts. Each basic action a ∈ A is identified with
the extended conceivable act f∗ ∈ F ∗ for which f∗(s) = s(a), for all s ∈ CˆA. Note also
that F ∗ does not include, among others, the constant act whose payoff is x. Given the
decision maker’s awareness, the set of extended conceivable acts F ∗ is the most that can
be both meaningfully expressed and settled ex post.
We consider lotteries over extended conceivable acts. Formally, denote by ∆(F ∗) the set
of all probability distributions on F ∗, and by ∆(F ) its subset of all probability distributions
on F . A generic element µ ∈ ∆(F ∗) selects an extended conceivable act in F ∗ according
to the distribution µ. We refer to the elements of ∆(F ∗) by the name mixed extended
conceivable acts. The set ∆(F ∗) of all such lotteries is the choice set. Decision makers are
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supposed to be able to form and express preferences over ∆(F ∗).7 It turns out that having
the decision maker express preferences over the set of mixed extended conceivable acts is, in
fact, sufficient to obtain a representation with a utility of unknown consequences. However,
this representation requires a non-standard approach because the domain of preferences is
“non-rectangular”.
We abuse notation and denote by c also the constant act that assigns c to every state
in CˆA, and by f the degenerate mixed extended conceivable act that assigns the unit
probability mass to the conceivable act f . For all µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(F ∗) and α ∈ [0, 1] , let
αµ + (1− α)µ′ ∈ ∆(F ∗) be defined as pointwise mixtures on the support of the mixed
conceivable acts (that is, (αµ+ (1− α)µ′) (f) = αµ (f) + (1− α)µ′ (f) , for all f ∈ F ∗).
Then ∆(F ∗) is a convex set. Finally, for any f, g ∈ F ∗ and E ⊂ CˆA, let gEf denote the
act in F ∗ defined by (gEf) (s) = g (s) , if s ∈ E, and (gEf) (s) = f (s) otherwise.
3 Subjective Expected Utility with Unknown Consequences
Consider next a decision maker whose choices are characterized by a (strict) preference
relation  on ∆(F ∗). We assume that  satisfies the well-known axioms of expected
utility theory.
(A.1) (Preorder) The preference relation  on ∆(F ∗) is asymmetric and negatively
transitive.8
(A.2) (Archimedean) For all µ, µ′, µ′′ ∈ ∆(F ∗), if µ  µ′ and µ′  µ′′ then there are
α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that αµ+ (1− α)µ′′  µ′ and µ′  βµ+ (1− β)µ′′.
(A.3) (Independence) For all µ, µ′, µ′′ ∈ ∆(F ∗) and α ∈ (0, 1], µ  µ′ if and only if
αµ+ (1− α)µ′′  αµ′ + (1− α)µ′′.
Define the weak preference relation, <, to be the negation of the strict preference
relation, (i.e., <= ¬ (≺)), and the indifference relation, ∼, to be the symmetric part of <.
7We suppose implicitly that decision makers are able to use devices to randomize their choices. Evidence
suggesting that decision makers deliberately randomize their choice is provided in Agranov and Ortelova
(2016).
8This implies that  is irreflexive and transitive (see Kreps [1988], proposition 2.3).
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Then, < is a weak order (i.e., complete and transitive) satisfying the corresponding version
of independence.
Because the choice set is the set of mixed extended conceivable acts, which is less
structured than the set of Anscombe-Aumann (1963) acts, we need additional structure
from the axioms to obtain an expected utility representation.9 For this purpose, we consider
the mapping ϕ : ∆(F ∗)→ (∆(Cˆ))CˆA , where, for all s ∈ CˆA, cˆ ∈ Cˆ and µ ∈ ∆(F ∗),
ϕs(µ)(cˆ) :=
∑
{f∈Supp(µ)|f(s)=cˆ}
µ(f). (4)
The mapping ϕ transforms each mixed extended conceivable act into an Anscombe-Aumann
act. More specifically, for each s ∈ CˆA, the vector ϕs(µ) ∈ ∆(Cˆ) is the lottery that ϕ(µ)
assigns to the state s. It is important to note that the support of the lotteries in the
resulting Anscombe-Aumann acts is a subset of C in the fully describable states CA, and
a subset of Cˆ in the imperfectly describable states CˆA \ CA. Thus, the set of Anscombe-
Aumann acts defined by the mapping in (4) inherits the non-rectangular shape of the set
of extended conceivable acts.
Henceforth, for {µ : Supp(µ) ⊆ F} we also denote by ϕs(µ) the mixed conceivable
act that assigns the probability ϕs(µ)(c) to the constant conceivable act c. Under this
convention, the set ∆(C) also denotes the subset of mixed conceivable acts whose supports
are restricted to the constant conceivable acts (that is, ∆(C) ⊂ ∆(F )).
Whereas the mapping ϕ yields a unique Anscombe-Aumann act for each µ ∈ ∆(F ∗),
in general, every Anscombe-Aumann act in the set derived from ∆(F ∗) using the mapping
ϕ corresponds to multiple mixed extended conceivable acts. Hence the need for an extra
axiom.10 The next axiom asserts that the decision maker is indifferent among mixed
extended conceivable acts whose images under ϕ are the same (that is, the decision maker
is indifferent between mixed extended conceivable acts that are transformed to the same
Anscombe-Aumann act).
(A.4) (Extended Indifference) For all µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(F ∗), if ϕ(µ) = ϕ(µ′) then µ ∼ µ′.
9Here we follow a procedure mentioned in Kreps (1988), Chapter 7. The next axiom is suggested there.
10Notice that everything could be done directly with this non-rectangular set of extended Anscombe-
Aumann acts, but for the reasons discussed in the introduction, we find the starting point of mixed extended
conceivable acts more satisfactory. If one were to start from the extended Anscombe-Aumann acts, one
would not need axiom (A.4).
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The next Lemma shows that preference relations restricted to ∆(F ) satisfying (A.1) -
(A.4) have expected utility (over conceivable acts) and additively separable (across states)
representations. To state the Lemma, we invoke the following definition: A set of real-
valued functions {Ws}s∈CˆA on C, representing a preference relation  on ∆(F ), is unique
up to cardinal unit-comparable transformation if the set {Wˆs}s∈CˆA on C also represents
the same preference relation if and only if Wˆs = bWs + ds, b > 0.
Lemma 1. A preference relation  on ∆(F ) satisfies (A.1) - (A.4) if and only if there
exist real-valued functions {Ws}s∈CˆA on C, unique up to cardinal unit-comparable trans-
formation, such that, for all µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(F ),
µ  µ′ ⇔
∑
f∈F
µ(f)
∑
s∈CˆA
Ws(f(s)) >
∑
f∈F
µ′(f)
∑
s∈CˆA
Ws(f(s)). (5)
Following Savage (1954), a state s ∈ CˆA is said to be null if cˆ{s}f ∼ cˆ′{s}f, for all
cˆ, cˆ′ ∈ Cˆ, for all f ∈ F ∗. A state is said to be nonnull if it is not null.
To state the next axiom we use the following notation: Let F˜ := {f˜ : CˆA \ CA →
Cˆ} (that is, F˜ is the set of all functions from the set of imperfectly describable states to
the set of extended consequences). Define sets of conditional extended conceivable acts as
follows: For every f ∈ F , let
FCˆA\CA(f) := {f˜CˆA\CAf ∈ F ∗ | f˜ ∈ F˜}
(that is, FCˆA\CA(f) is the set of all acts in F
∗ that are extensions of f ∈ F ). A schematic
illustration is given in Figure 2. The range of f is C and the acts in FCˆA\CA(f) all agree
with f on CA and return any consequence in Cˆ in the states in CˆA \ CA. Note that
∪f∈FFCˆA\CA(f) = F ∗.
We denote by ∆
(
FCˆA\CA(f)
)
the corresponding set of mixed conditional extended
conceivable acts. For each f ∈ F and pˆ ∈ ∆(Cˆ), let pˆCˆA\CAf denote the distribution in
∆(F ∗) that, for all cˆ ∈ Cˆ, assigns the probability pˆ(cˆ) to the extended conceivable act
cˆCˆA\CAf .
Given f ∈ F ∗, let F ∗(f, s) := {c{s}f ∈ F ∗ | c ∈ C} if s ∈ CA and F˜ (f, s) := {cˆ{s}f ∈
F ∗ | cˆ ∈ Cˆ} if s ∈ CˆA \ CA. Denote by ∆(F ∗(f, s)) and ∆(F˜ (f, s)) the subsets of mixed
extended conceivable acts whose supports are F ∗ (f, s) and F˜ (f, s), respectively.
(A.5) (Monotonicity) For all f ∈ F ∗, (a) For all nonnull s ∈ CA, µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(F ∗(f, s)),
and ϕs (µ) , ϕs (µ′) ∈ ∆(C) ⊂ ∆(F ∗), it holds that µ  µ′ if and only if ϕs (µ) 
12
Figure 2: Illustration of the set of conditional extended conceivable acts for a particular f
-
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 ︸ ︷︷ ︸bCA\CA
ϕs (µ′). (b) For all µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(F˜ (f, s)) and nonnull s ∈ CˆA \ CA, it holds that µ  µ′
if and only if ϕs(µ)CˆA\CAf  ϕs(µ′)CˆA\CAf.
In the monotonicity axiom the mixed conceivable acts, µ and µ′, have as their supports
conceivable acts whose payoffs differ in a single state, s. The Anscombe-Aumann acts,
induced by µ and µ′, agree in every state except s, in which they yield ϕs(µ) and ϕs(µ′),
respectively. The axiom states that the direction of preference between µ and µ′ is the same
as the direction of preference between the mixed conceivable acts that have distributions
ϕs(µ) and ϕs(µ′) over the constant conceivable acts. Similarly, the mixed extended con-
ceivable acts µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(F˜ (f, s)), have the same conditional distributions ϕs(µ)CˆA\CAf and
ϕs(µ′)CˆA\CAf over the conditional (on Cˆ
A \ CA) constant conceivable acts.11 Thus, our
monotonicity axiom is of the same spirit and plays the same role as the monotonicity axiom
in the Anscombe-Aumann model. However, its expression is different because the decision
maker’s choice set consists of mixed extended conceivable acts.12
The next axiom requires that the decision maker is not indifferent among all mixed
extended conceivable acts.
11In part (b) of the axiom, we abuse notation slightly by letting ϕs(µ)CˆA\CAf and ϕs(µ
′)CˆA\CAf denote
mixed extended conceivable acts whose support include extended conceivable acts that are constant at x
on CˆA \ CA.
12It is not straightforward to extend Axiom (A.5) to F ∗, because F ∗ does not contain the constant act
x.
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(A.6) (Nontriviality) The strict preference relation  on ∆(F ∗) is nonempty.
Note that (A.6) implies the existence of consequences, c∗, c∗ ∈ Cˆ, such that c∗  c∗.
Proposition 1. Let  be a preference relation on ∆(F ∗), then the following two conditions
are equivalent:
(i) The preference relation  satisfies (A.1) - (A.6).
(ii.a) There exist a real-valued, continuous, nonconstant, affine, function, U on ∆(C),
and a probability measure, pi on CˆA, such that, for all µ, λ ∈ ∆(F ),
µ  λ⇔
∑
s∈CˆA
pi(s)U(ϕs(µ)) >
∑
s∈CˆA
pi(s)U(ϕs(λ)). (6)
(ii.b) For every f ∈ F, there exist a real-valued, non-constant, affine, function, U∗f on
∆(Cˆ), and a probability measure, φ on CˆA \ CA, such that, for all µ and λ in
∆(FCˆA\CA (f)),
µ  λ⇔
∑
s∈CˆA\CA
φ(s)U∗f (ϕs(µ)) >
∑
s∈CˆA\CA
φ(s)U∗f (ϕs(λ)). (7)
Moreover, each of the functions U and U∗f is unique up to positive linear transforma-
tions, the probability measures, pi and φ, are unique, and pi(s) = φ(s) = 0 if and only
if s is null.
The proof is in the appendix.
By the affinity of U, U(ϕs(µ)) = Σc∈Supp(ϕs(µ))ϕs(µ)(c)u(c), where u is a real-valued
function on C. Similarly, for each f ∈ F, U∗f (ϕs(µ) = Σcˆ∈Supp(ϕs(µ))ϕs(µ)(cˆ)uf (cˆ), where
uf is a real-valued function on Cˆ.
Since the sets ∆(F ) and ∆
(
FCˆA\CA(f)
)
intersect (see Figures 1 and 2), the represen-
tations in (6) and (7) together imply that U∗f (p) = U(p), for all f ∈ F and p ∈ ∆(C), and
that φ(s) = pi(s)/pi(CˆA \ CA), for all s ∈ CˆA \ CA. However, the utility of the abstract
consequence x, U∗f (x), may depend on the act f . The next axiom, separability, links the
conditional representations in Proposition 1. The axiom requires that the ranking of mixed
conditional extended conceivable acts whose supports are constant on the set of partially
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describable states, CˆA \ CA, be independent of the conditioning act. This separability is
not implied by the independence axiom because the payoff x is not defined on the subset
of fully describable states.
(A.7) (Separability) For all f, g ∈ F ∗ and pˆ, qˆ ∈ ∆(Cˆ), qˆCˆA\CAf  pˆCˆA\CAf if and only
if qˆCˆA\CAg  pˆCˆA\CAg.
In the next theorem, we use the separability axiom to combine the representations in
(6) and (7). This allows us to obtain a general subjective expected utility representation
that includes an assignment of utility to the abstract consequence x.
Theorem 1. Let  be a preference relation on ∆(F ∗), then the following conditions are
equivalent:
(i) The preference relation satisfies axioms (A.1) - (A.7).
(ii) There exist real-valued, non-constant, affine, functions, U on ∆(C) and U∗ on ∆(Cˆ),
and a probability measure, pi on CˆA, such that, for all µ,λ ∈ ∆(F ∗), µ  λ if and
only if∑
s∈CA
pi(s)U(ϕs(µ))+
∑
s∈CˆA\CA
pi(s)U∗(ϕs(µ)) >
∑
s∈CA
pi(s)U(ϕs(λ))+
∑
s∈CˆA\CA
pi(s)U∗(ϕs(λ)).
(8)
Moreover, the functions U and U∗ are unique up to positive linear transformations
and they agree on ∆(C).13 Also, the probability measure is unique, with pi(s) = 0 if
and only if s is null.
The proof is in the appendix. By the affinity of U∗, U∗(ϕs(µ)) = Σcˆ∈Supp(ϕs(µ))ϕs(µ)(cˆ)u
∗(cˆ),
where u∗ is a real-valued function on Cˆ.14
As Theorem 1 shows, enriching the framework to include extended conceivable acts
has allowed us to obtain an expected utility representation that assigns utility to unknown
consequences. The representation consists of three elements: beliefs over states, a Bernoulli
13A different way of saying that U and U∗ agree on ∆(C) is to say that U∗ is an extension of U .
14Recall that we use ϕs(µ) to also denote the mixed conceivable act that assigns the probability ϕs (µ) (c)
to the constant conceivable act c. For expository convenience, we use this shorthand notation in the
representation. To emphasize, the representation indeed evaluates mixed extended conceivable acts.
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utility function over known consequences, and a parameter, u∗(x), that captures the de-
cision maker’s utility of, or attitude toward, the unknown. This utility reflects whether
the decision maker faces the unknown with fear, excitement, or indifference. Comparing
two decision makers, the one with the higher value of u∗(x) exhibits excitement toward the
unknown relative to the decision maker with the lower value, who is more fearful toward
the unknown. If the set of imperfectly describable states is null, the decision maker is a
standard subjective expected utility maximizer.
3.1 An Example
One advantage of our framework is that it distinguishes between states in which different
basic actions result in new consequences, as illustrated in the matrix (1) in Section 2.1.
Therefore this framework accommodates viewing different actions as being more or less
likely to increase awareness. If unforeseeable consequences generate excitement, actions
that are perceived as more likely to result in such consequences are expected to be preferred
over similar actions that are less likely to result in unforeseeable consequences. Consider,
for example, the matrix (1). Suppose that the decision maker is confident that the action
a1 is unlikely to reveal an unforeseen consequence. Specifically, the medication a1 has
been in use for some time and has shown no side-effects. Suppose that the decision maker
believes that if she chooses a1 either the consequence c1, success, or c2 failure, will obtain.
In other words, on the basis of past experience, the decision maker believes that if a1 is
implemented it is impossible that “neither c1 nor c2” (that is, x) will obtain. Formally,
she considers the event {s5, s6, s9} to be null. By contrast, she considers x to be a real
possibility if the new medication, a2, is chosen. Thus, the event {s7, s8} is assigned positive
probability. By the representation (8),
a1 7→ U(c1) [pi(s1) + pi(s3) + pi(s7)] + U(c2) [pi(s2) + pi(s4) + pi(s8)] ,
and
a2 7→ U(c1) [pi(s1) + pi(s2)] + U(c2) [pi(s3) + pi(s4)] + U∗(x) [pi(s7) + pi(s8)] .
Therefore, a choice of a2 over a1 yields a higher probability of encountering unforeseeable
side-effects, or consequence, x. If U(c1) < U∗(x) and pi(s3) ≤ pi(s2)+pi(s8), then a2  a1.15
15Note that U(c1) > U(c2). If U(c1) = U
∗(x), then a2 < a1 reduces to [U(c1) − U(c2)][pi(s3) − pi(s2) −
pi(s8)] ≤ 0, which is satisfied given the assumption about the probabilities. If U(c1) < U∗(x), we have that
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To grasp the difference in the analysis if the same issue is addressed in the model of
Karni and Vierø (2013), recall that in that model the state space consists solely of the fully
describable states. Consequently, that model is silent on the distinction between the null
event {s5, s6, s9} and the event {s7, s8}. Neither of these events, nor their union, can be
expressed in that model. Hence, according to Karni and Vierø (2013), the utility associated
with the two medications are:
a1 7→ U(c1) [pˆi(s1) + pˆi(s3)] + U(c2) [pˆi(s2) + pˆi(s4)] ,
and
a2 7→ U(c1) [pˆi(s1) + pˆi(s2)] + U(c2) [pˆi(s3) + pˆi(s4)] ,
where pˆi is the subjective probability measure that figured in that work. It is possible,
therefore, that our (2013) ‘reverse Bayesianism’ model would predict that a1 is chosen
over a2 (that is, if pˆi(s3) > pˆi(s2)) while the present model predicts the opposite choice
behavior. Furthermore, if pi(s8) > 0 then the opposite predictions may arise even when
the two models are consistent in the sense of having the same likelihood ratios of s3 and
s2 (that is, pi(s2)/pi(s3) = pˆi(s2)/pˆi(s3)).
4 Growing Awareness and the Evolution of Beliefs
Thus far our attention was restricted to the axiomatic structure and representation of
preference relations for a given level of awareness. We now turn to the study of the decision
maker’s growing awareness and the evolution of her beliefs in response to such expansions.
The decision maker’s awareness expands when she discovers a new consequence that was
hidden behind a “veil of ignorance,” that we referred to as “none of the above”. As
the analysis that follows makes clear, the characterization of the evolution of a decision
maker’s beliefs in the wake of her growing awareness does not require assigning utility to
the abstract consequence “none of the above.”
Henceforth, we use the subscript 0 to index the various sets under the prior level
of awareness and the subscript 1 to index the various sets under the posterior level of
awareness. Thus, C0, x0, Cˆ0, CA0 , Cˆ
A
0 , F0, F
∗
0 , etc. refer to the respective sets under the
prior level of awareness, with the analogous notation for the posterior sets.
a2  a1.
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As awareness grows, the state space evolves as follows. If a new consequence, c′ /∈ C0,
is discovered, the set of feasible consequences expands to C1 = C0 ∪ {c′}. At the same
time, the abstract consequence that has the interpretation “none of the above” becomes
x1 = ¬C1, and the extended set of consequences becomes Cˆ1 = C1 ∪ {x1}. The posterior
conceivable state space is CˆA1 . In our illustrating example, if a new consequence c3 is
discovered, the augmented conceivable state space becomes
A/S s1 s2 s3 s4 s
′
5 s5 s
′
6 s6 s
′
7 s7 s
′
8 s8 s
′
9 s
′′
9 s
′′′
9 s9
a1 c1 c2 c1 c2 c3 x1 c3 x1 c1 c1 c2 c2 c3 c3 x1 x1
a2 c1 c1 c2 c2 c1 c1 c2 c2 c3 x1 c3 x1 c3 x1 c3 x1
(9)
The set of fully describable states also expands and is now CA1 = C
A
0 ∪ {s′5, s′6, s′7, s′8, s′9}.
Thus, when a new feasible consequence is discovered, each of the prior fully describable
states remains as before, while each of the prior imperfectly describable states is split
into a fully describable state and one, or more, posterior imperfectly describable states.
Hence, elements are added to the subset of fully describable states and, simultaneously, the
number of imperfectly describable states increases16. As the decision maker’s augmented
conceivable state space expands, so does the set of conceivable acts, to F1 := {f : CˆA1 →
C1}, and the set of extended conceivable acts to F ∗1 := {f∗ : CˆA1 → Cˆ1 | f∗−1(x1) ⊆
CˆA1 \CA1 }. The corresponding set of mixed conceivable acts is ∆(F1) and the set of mixed
extended conceivable acts is ∆(F ∗1 ).
Because the set of conceivable acts is variable in our model, the preference relation must
be redefined on the extended domain. Therefore, a decision maker is characterized by a
collection of preference relations, one for each level of awareness over the corresponding set
of mixed extended conceivable acts. We denote the strict preference relation on ∆(F ∗i ) by
i, i = 0, 1. In particular, the prior preference relation is denoted by 0 on ∆(F ∗0 ) and the
posterior preference relation by 1 on ∆(F ∗1 ). We denote by ϕi the mapping given by (4)
16At first glance, the introduction of the abstract consequence x may seem to make the discovery of new
consequences similar to the discovery of new actions as the two types discoveries can be expressed in terms
of refinement of the original state-space. However, the two refinements are different. Unlike the discovery
of new actions which refines the state space by associating to every state in the prior state space a set of
states, one for each consequence, (see Karni and Vierø [2013]), the refinement of the prior space induced
by the discovery of consequences of which the decision maker was unaware, is confined to the originally
partially and non-describable states and takes the specific form as illustrated in (9). A formal definition of
the refinement appears in the discussion preceding the introduction of axiom (A.10) below.
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for awareness level i.
4.1 Reverse Bayesian Updating
To link the preference relations across expanding sets of mixed extended conceivable acts,
we invoke the relevant part of the invariant risk preferences axiom introduced in Karni and
Vierø (2013), asserting the commonality of risk attitudes across levels of awareness.17 Re-
call that ∆(C0) ⊂ ∆(F0) also denotes the subset of mixed conceivable acts whose supports
are the constant conceivable acts in F0, and note that, for C1 ⊃ C0, we also have that
∆(C0) ⊂ ∆(F1).
(A.8) (Invariant risk preferences) For i on ∆(Fi), i = 0, 1, and for all µ, µ′ ∈ ∆ (C0) ,
it holds that µ 0 µ′ if and only if µ 1 µ′.
Assuming that i on ∆(Fi), i = 0, 1, are non-trivial, there are c∗i , ci∗ ∈ Ci such that
c∗i i ci∗, i = 0, 1. One implication of the invariant risk preferences axiom is that we may
choose c∗0 = c∗1 = c∗ and c0∗ = c1∗ = c∗. Hence, for this particular purpose, we can simply
write c∗ i c∗, i = 0, 1.
The following two axioms depict additional links between the preference relations across
different levels of awareness. The first axiom, dubbed Awareness Consistency I, asserts that
the discovery of new consequences does not alter the decision maker’s preferences condi-
tional on the events that consist of a-priori fully describable states. Thus, such discoveries
do not affect the part of her preferences that only concerns the initially fully describ-
able and well-understood part of her universe. Formally, for every h ∈ Fi and E ⊂ CˆAi ,
let Fi(h;E) := {fEh ∈ Fi | f ∈ Fi}, i = 0, 1. For all E ⊆ CA0 , λ ∈ ∆(F0(h;E)), and
λ′ ∈ ∆(F1(h′;E)) define λ = λ′ on E if ϕ0s (λ) = ϕ1s (λ′) , for all s ∈ E. That is, λ = λ′ on
E if the mapping ϕ generates the same lottery for λ and λ′ in all states in E.
17The axiom appears in almost all works on unawareness and unforseen contingencies. In particular, it
is implicit in Maskin and Tirole (1999), Halpern and Rego (2014), Grant and Quiggin (2013), Heifetz et
al. (2013), Auster (2013), and Schipper and Woo (2015). Ma and Schipper (2016) test the invariant risk
preferences axiom experimentally and cannot reject it. Mengel, Tsakas, and Vostroknutov (2016) find that
risk preferences are affected by exposure to an environment with imperfect knowledge of the state space.
Ma and Schipper observe that Mengel et al.’s experimental design is likely to leave subjects suspecting that
they are still unaware of some states after the initial exposure. Hence their result might capture changes
in the subjects’ attitude toward the unknown rather than in their risk preferences.
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(A.9) Awareness consistency I: For all E ⊆ CA0 , for all h ∈ F0, λ, µ ∈ ∆(F0(h;E)),
h′ ∈ F1, and λ′, µ′ ∈ ∆(F1(h′;E)), such that, on E, λ = λ′ and µ = µ′, it holds that,
λ ∼0 µ if and only if λ′ ∼1 µ′.
The second axiom, dubbed Awareness Consistency II, asserts that the discovery of
new consequences does not alter the decision maker’s preferences conditional on the events
that consist of, a-priori, not fully describable states. In other words, the decision maker’s
ranking of a-priori measurable acts is independent of the detail with which she can describe
the a-priori measurable sub-events. To state the axiom, we need additional notation and
definitions. If C0 ⊂ C1 then, for each s ∈ CˆA0 \ CA0 , there corresponds an event E′(s) ⊂
CˆA1 \ CA0 , defined by
E′(s) = {sˆ ∈ CˆA1 \ CA0 | ∀a ∈ A, if a(s) ∈ C0, then a(sˆ) = a(s),
and if a(s) = x0 then a(sˆ) ∈ {x1} ∪ (C1 \ C0)}. (10)
For each E ⊆ CˆA0 \CA0 let E′(E) := ∪s∈EE′(s). A conceivable act f ′ ∈ F1 is said to be
measurable with respect to CˆA0 if for all c ∈ C1, (f ′)−1(c) = E′(E), for some E ⊆ CˆA0 . Let
F1(CˆA0 ) be the subset of the conceivable acts in F1 that are measurable with respect to Cˆ
A
0 .
There is a one-to-one correspondence between acts in F0 and acts in F1(CˆA0 ): For f ∈ F0
and f ′ ∈ F1(CˆA0 ), we write f ' f ′ if f ′(s′) = f(s), for all s′ ∈ E′(s) and s ∈ CˆA0 . For
every h′ ∈ F1(CˆA0 ) and E ⊂ CˆA0 , let F1(CˆA0 ;h′;E′(E)) := {fE′(E)h′ | f ∈ F1(CˆA0 )} (that
is, F1(CˆA0 ;h
′;E′(E)) is the set of CˆA0 -measurable acts in F1 that agree with h′ outside of
E′(E)). For λ ∈ ∆(F0(h;E)) and λ′ ∈ ∆(F1(CˆA0 ;h′;E′(E))), we write λ ' λ′ if λ(f) =
λ′(f ′) when f ' f ′.
(A.10) Awareness consistency II: For all E ⊆ CˆA0 \CA0 , h ∈ F0, λ, µ ∈ ∆(F0(h;E)),
h′ ∈ F1(CˆA0 ) and λ′, µ′ ∈ ∆(F1(CˆA0 ;h′;E′(E))), such that λ ' λ′ and µ ' µ′, it holds
that λ ∼0 µ if and only if λ′ ∼1 µ′.
For preference relations satisfying the aforementioned axioms, Theorem 2 below asserts
the existence and describes the uniqueness properties of a subjective expected utility repre-
sentation for each level of awareness. More importantly, it describes the evolution of beliefs
about the relative likelihoods of fully describable events and about the relative likelihoods
of imperfectly describable events, in the wake of increasing awareness.
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Theorem 2. For each C0 ⊂ C1 and the corresponding preference relations 0 on ∆(F0)
and 1 on ∆(F1), the following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) The preference relations 0 and 1 satisfy (A.1) - (A.6) and, jointly, they satisfy
(A.8) - (A.10).
(ii) There exist real-valued, continuous, nonconstant, affine, functions, U0 on ∆(C0) and
U1 on ∆(C1), and probability measures, pi0 on CˆA0 and pi1 on Cˆ
A
1 , such that for all
µ, λ ∈ ∆(F0),
µ 0 λ⇔
∑
s∈CˆA0
pi0(s)U0(ϕ0s(µ)) >
∑
s∈CˆA0
pi0(s)U0(ϕ0s(λ)), (11)
and, for all µ′, λ′ ∈ ∆(F1),
µ′ 1 λ′ ⇔
∑
s∈CˆA1
pi1(s)U1(ϕ1s(µ
′)) >
∑
s∈CˆA1
pi1(s)U1(ϕ1s(λ
′)). (12)
The functions U0 and U1 are unique up to positive linear transformations and for all
p ∈ ∆ (C0) , U0 (p) = U1 (p) . The probability measures pi0 and pi1 are unique and, for
all s, s′ ∈ CA0 ,
pi0(s)
pi0(s′)
=
pi1(s)
pi1(s′)
(13)
and, for all s, s′ ∈ CˆA0 \ CA0 ,
pi0(s)
pi0(s′)
=
pi1(E′(s))
pi1(E′(s′))
. (14)
By the affinity of Ui, Ui(ϕis(µ)) = Σc∈Supp(ϕis(µ))ϕ
i
s(µ)(c)ui(c), where ui is a real-valued
function on Ci, for i = 0, 1. That U0(p) = U1(p) for all p ∈ ∆(C0) follows from axiom
(A.8). Property (13) follows from axiom (A.9) and asserts that, in the wake of discoveries
of new consequences, conditional on the initial set of fully describable states, the decision
maker’s subjective beliefs about the relative likelihoods of fully describable states remain
unchanged. Property (14) follows from axiom (A.10) and asserts that the decision maker’s
subjective beliefs about the relative likelihood of events corresponding to a-priori partially
describable states is the same as the relative likelihood of the corresponding states. Prop-
erty (13) is reverse Bayesian updating following the discovery of a new consequence as in
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Karni and Vierø (2013). Thus, insofar as the discovery of new consequences is concerned,
the model of Karni and Vierø (2013) is nested within the present one and corresponds to
the special case when pii(CAi ) = 1 for all i. That is, in Karni and Vierø (2013), for any level
of awareness the decision maker acts as if he assigns probability zero to future expansions
of his awareness.
Remark: The main objective of Theorem 2 is the depiction of the evolution of the
decision maker’s beliefs. To attain this objective it is not necessary to consider the utility
of the abstract consequences x0 and x1. Therefore, unlike in Theorem 1, in Theorem 2
the domains of the utility functions U0 and U1 are ∆(C0) and ∆(C1), respectively. It is a
straightforward exercise to extend the representations in Theorem 2 to include utilities of
the abstract consequences x0 and x1.
4.2 Decreasing and increasing sense of ignorance
A decision maker can respond to the discovery of a new consequence in one of three different
ways: First, she could think that fewer consequences remain to be discovered. Second, the
discovery of new consequences could reveal that the decision maker is more ignorant than
she believed herself to be, and that more consequences than she suspected are waiting
to be discovered. Third, she could consider that the current discovery has no effect on
the prevalence of unknown consequences. Thus, the discovery of unforeseen consequences
expands the decision maker’s universe and, depending on their nature, may be accompanied
by diminishing, growing, or unchanged sense of ignorance. These reactions have revealed
preference manifestations that can be expressed axiomatically.
The next axiom captures the preferential expression of decreasing (increasing) sense of
ignorance. In both cases, the axiom describes the decision maker’s willingness to bet on,
or against, discoveries of unforeseen consequences.
(A.11) (Decreasing (Increasing) Sense of Ignorance) For all C0 ⊂ C1, the cor-
responding sets of mixed conceivable acts ∆(F0) and ∆(F1), η ∈ [0, 1], and λ =
ηc∗ + (1− η) c∗ ∈ ∆(F0), λ′ = ηc∗ + (1− η) c∗ ∈ ∆(F1), µ = c∗CA0 c
∗ ∈ ∆(F0), and
µ′ = c∗CA1 c
∗ ∈ ∆(F1), if λ ∼0 µ then λ′ <1 (41)µ′.
Note that this is a decreasing (increasing) sense of ignorance in the weak sense. It
includes the cases of strictly decreasing (increasing) sense of ignorance, λ′ 1 (≺1) µ′,
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and constant sense of ignorance, λ′ ∼1 µ′, as special instances. The mixed conceivable
acts λ and λ′ only involve objective uncertainty, while µ and µ′ are bets on discovering
unforeseen consequences. A decision maker has a constant sense of ignorance if she is
equally inclined to bet on something unforeseen arising (that is, on the realization of an
imperfectly describable state) before and after the discovery of a new consequence. She
has a strictly decreasing (increasing) sense of ignorance if she is less (more) inclined to bet
on the realization of imperfectly describable states after the discovery.
Theorem 3 below quantifies decreasing (increasing) sense of ignorance by subjective
probabilities. Specifically, if growing awareness is accompanied by decreasing (increas-
ing) sense of ignorance, the subjective probability assigned to the ‘residual’ unawareness
diminishes (grows).
Theorem 3. For each pair C0 ⊂ C1 and the corresponding preference relations, 0 on
∆(F0) and 1 on ∆(F1), the following statements are equivalent:
(i) The preference relations 0 and 1 satisfy (A.1) - (A.6) and, jointly, they satisfy
(A.8) - (A.11).
(ii) There exists a representation as in Theorem 2 and, in addition,
pi0(CˆA0 \ CA0 ) ≥ (≤) pi1(CˆA1 \ CA1 ). (15)
Inequality (15) includes the case of strictly decreasing (increasing) sense of ignorance,
pi0(CˆA0 \ CA0 ) > (<) pi1(CˆA1 \ CA1 ) , and the case of constant ignorance, pi0(CˆA0 \ CA0 ) =
pi1(CˆA1 \ CA1 ), as special instances.
The model of Karni and Vierø (2013, 2015) is the special case of growing awareness in
which the decision maker exhibits a constant sense of ignorance, assigning zero probability
to discovery of new consequences. In those works, discoveries of unforeseen consequences
are unanticipated.
5 Concluding Remarks
5.1 Small Worlds
The definitions of the state space and the set of conceivable acts, derived from the entire sets
of basic actions and consequences, depict the grand world. When facing specific decisions,
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however, it is natural to suppose that the decision maker constructs the relevant choice
set as follows: First, she identifies the relevant courses of action, or relevant basic actions,
available (e.g., lists the means of transportation and routes to go from here to there, lists the
available treatments of an illness). Second, she identifies the relevant consequences of the
relevant basic actions (e.g., getting there late or not at all, allergic reaction to medication
or bad outcome of surgery). Third, she constructs the relevant state space. For a given
specific decision problem, let Ar ⊂ A and Cr ⊂ C denote, respectively, the relevant set of
basic actions and consequences. Using these primitives, construct the relevant state space,
CArr . The set of relevant conceivable acts is Fr (that is, the set of all mappings from C
Ar
r to
Cr). The set of all mixtures of these, ∆(Fr), constitutes the relevant choice set. Suppose
that the decision maker’s preferences on ∆(Fr) is the restriction of  to ∆(Fr).
In this context, unawareness amounts to failure (e.g., due to lack of attention, forget-
fulness) to consider some relevant consequences when constructing the choice set for the
decision problem at hand. In other words, some consequences that the decision maker
is aware of and that should have been included in the set of relevant consequences, are
neglected.
Analogously to awareness of unawareness, the decision maker may anticipate that she
may have neglected to include in her deliberation some relevant consequences. Define
an abstract consequence xr = ¬Cr to represent neglected relevant consequences. Then,
application of the analysis of section 2 yields the probability the decision maker assigns to
the possibility of failing to include relevant consequences, and the utility of the concern
(fear) that relevant consequences have been neglected.
5.2 The evolution of beliefs about describable events
Theorem 2 concerns the evolution of the relative likelihoods of fully describable (and also of
the relative likelihoods of imperfectly describable) events, in the wake of discovery of new
consequences, but is silent on the absolute likelihoods. By contrast, Theorem 3 concerns
the evolution of the absolute likelihoods of the imperfectly describable event. Therefore,
combining the results of the two theorems makes it possible to discuss the magnitude
of the change in beliefs about the likelihoods of fully describable events. For instance,
suppose that a new discovery is accompanied by a constant sense of unawareness. By
Theorem 3, pi0(CˆA0 \ CA0 ) = pi1(CˆA1 \ CA1 ). But Σs∈CA0 pi0(s) + pi0(Cˆ
A
0 \ CA0 ) = 1 and
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Σs∈CA0 pi1(s) + Σs∈CA1 \CA0 pi1(s) + pi1(Cˆ
A
1 \CA1 ) = 1. Hence, probability mass must be shifted
from the set of originally fully describable states CA0 to C
A
1 \ CA0 , proportionally (that is,
the probabilities of all the states in CA0 must be reduced equiproportionally). Similarly, an
increasing sense of unawareness requires that probability mass must be shifted from CA0
to CˆA1 \ CA0 proportionally, and that some of this probability must be shifted to CˆA1 \ CA1 .
Decreasing sense of unawareness implies that some probability mass of the event CˆA0 \CA0
is shifted toward the newly describable event CA1 \ CA0 . In the latter instance, the effect
of growing awareness on the subjective probability assigned to the set of originally fully
describable states, CA0 , is unpredictable.
5.3 Awareness of unawareness: Behavioral manifestations
The theory advanced in this paper presumes that decision makers are aware of their un-
awareness. In other words, we suppose that decision makers are aware of the possible
existence of indescribable consequences but have no clue as to what they might be. To
elicit a decision maker’s probability of the partially describable event we specify bets that
mention the payoff in this event. This procedure is justified on the aforementioned pre-
sumption.
Our approach raises a methodological issue, namely, is there a way of testing the pre-
sumption that a decision maker is aware of his unawareness?18 Put differently, how can an
observer infer, from a decision maker’s choice behavior, that she is aware of her unaware-
ness? Below we describe possible patterns of choice that would indicate that the decision
maker is indeed aware of being unaware.19
Partially specified bets: Consider the example in Section 3.1 of two basic actions and
two feasible consequences. The augmented conceivable state space is depicted in matrix
(1). Let c1  c2 and consider the set of partially specified bets: B := {b : CA → C}. Note
that the domain of these bets is the event, CA, that consists of all the fully describable
states, and the payoffs are feasible consequences.
Consider two bets: b1 is a bet on the event that a1 results in c1, and b2 is the bet that
a2 results in c1. Formally, b1 = c1{s1,s3}c2 and b2 = c1{s1,s2}c2, where the states si, i = 1, 2, 3
are the states depicted in matrix (1). Note that b1 specifies the payoffs as follows: Pay c1
18We thank Larry Epstein for raising this issue.
19The issue of detecting unawareness itself is investigated in Schipper (2013).
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in the event {s1, s3} and c2 otherwise. Hence, in the description of b1 there is no mention
of any event other than {s1, s3}. In particular, there is no mention of the event {s5, ..., s9}
that consists of partially describable and non describable states. Similarly, for b2.20
The following choice patterns indicate that the decision maker is aware that the domain
of the bets may include the partially describable states:
Pattern 1: b1 ∼ b2 and ¬(a1 ∼ a2). The indifference, b1 ∼ b2, means that the decision
maker regards the events “a1 pays c1” and “a2 pays c1” as equally likely. If the decision
maker is only aware of the fully describable states then b1 and b2 are replicas of a1 and a2,
respectively. Therefore, a1 and a2 should be indifferent to one another. The fact that they
are not is an indication that the decision maker considers possible events that are not fully
describable.
Pattern 2: bi  bj , and aj < ai, i = 1, 2, j 6= i. By the same reasoning as above, if the
decision maker is only aware of the fully describable states, b1 and b2 are replicas of a1 and
a2, respectively. Hence, b1  b2 would imply that a1  a2. The fact that it is not indicates
that the decision maker considers possible events that are partially describable events.
To illustrate this point consider again the example of the two medications described
above. A decision maker may bet that the new, untried, medication, which proved more
effective in clinical trials, is more likely to result in success than the old, tried, one. Yet,
being worried by the prospect of unknown side-effects and believing that such effects are
more likely if the newly approved medication is used, she chooses to take the tried medica-
tion. These choice patterns indicate not only that the decision maker is aware of partially
describable events. They suggest that she regards the occurrence of such events more likely
under one basic action than under another.
5.4 “Unknown unknown” consequences in subjective expected utility
theory
The main objectives of this paper are to (a) provide a framework for the study of deci-
sion makers’ anticipation that there may be consequences of which they are unaware, (b)
quantify the decision makers’ subjective beliefs regarding the likelihood of such event and
20The standard practice in decision theory is that bets specify the payoffs in every state. By contrast,
partially specified bets are defined on the fully describable part of the state space. This partial specification
is intended to allow the decision maker to complete the supports of the bets, if the unmentioned part of
the state space exists in her mind, in any way she can imagine.
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how these beliefs change upon discoveries of consequences of which they were unaware, and
(c) quantify decision makers’ attitudes toward possible discovery of consequences of which
they are unaware. A key idea invoked in this investigation is a “catch-all” consequence, de-
fined as “none of the existing consequences,” designed to capture the notion of “unknown
unknown” consequences. A natural question is: Could this investigation be conducted
by incorporating the “catch-all” consequence into a standard expected utility setting a` la
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) or Savage (1954)?
Consider the Anscombe-Aumann model. Let S be a finite set of states and denote by
X a finite set of outcomes. Let xˆ denote the “catch-all” outcome “none of the outcomes
in X” (that is, xˆ = ¬X). Define Xˆ = X ∪ {xˆ} and denote by ∆Xˆ the set of probability
distributions on Xˆ. Extending Anscombe and Aumann’s approach, the choice set consists
of all mappings from S to ∆Xˆ, representing alternative courses of action. This formula-
tion of the Anscombe-Aumann model requires that acts assign objective probabilities to
the non-describable “catch-all” outcome xˆ. It also requires that the decision maker can
consider a choice that includes the constant act that pays off xˆ in every state (that is,
receiving xˆ for sure) when, by definition, this “unknown unknown” consequence cannot be
described in a meaningful way.21 Put differently, such formulation assumes the existence
of xˆ and that it is treated like any other consequence, thus defeating the purpose of in-
ferring from the decision maker’s behavior whether, and to what degree, he believes that
consequences of which he is unaware exists. If one did admit acts whose range is ∆Xˆ,
the subjective expected utility model would assign utility to xˆ, similarly to the result in
Section 3 above. However, because the state space is fixed, the model cannot accommo-
date the assignment of subjective probability to the discovery of consequences of which the
decision maker is unaware, or the analysis of the change of these beliefs upon the discovery
of such consequences, including the changes in the decision maker’s sense of unawareness.
In other words, adding a “catch-all” consequence to the standard models will defeat some
of the main objectives of this work. These observations are not restricted to the subjective
expected utility models, rather they apply to all models based on analytical frameworks
that take the state space to be a primitive concept.
21The fact that xˆ can be described, abstractly, negatively as “none of the elements in X” does not lend
it concrete meaning.
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5.5 Related literature
The exploration of the issue of (un)awareness in the literature has pursued three different
approaches; the epistemic approach, the game-theoretic or interactive decision making
approach, and the choice-theoretic approach.
The epistemic approach is taken in Fagin and Halpern (1988), Dekel, Lipman, and
Rustichini (1998), Modica and Rustichini (1999), Halpern (2001), Heifetz, Meier, and
Schipper (2006, 2008), Li (2009), Hill (2010), Board and Chung (2011), Walker (2014) and
Halpern and Rego (2009, 2013). Among these, Board and Chung (2011), Walker (2014)
and Halpern and Rego (2009, 2013) consider awareness of unawareness. Halpern and Rego
(2009) provide a logic that allows for an agent to explicitly know that there exists a fact
of which he is unaware. They do so by introducing quantification over variables in their
language. In Halpern and Rego (2009), it is impossible for an agent to consider it possible
that he is aware of all formulas in the language and also consider it possible that he is not
aware of all formulas. Halpern and Rego (2013) remedies this problem, such that an agent
can be uncertain about whether he is aware of all formulas. The choice theoretic model we
present is in line with the latter Halpern and Rego approach. Schipper (2015) provides an
excellent overview of the epistemic literature as well as of the literature on awareness and
unawareness more generally.
The game-theoretic, or interactive decision making, approach is taken in Halpern and
Rego (2008, 2014), Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a, 2013b), Heinsalu (2014), and Grant
and Quiggin (2013). The last develops a model of games with awareness in which inductive
reasoning may cause an individual to entertain the possibility that her awareness is limited.
Individuals thus have inductive support for propositions expressing their own unawareness.
In this paper, we implicitly assume inductive reasoning to motivate considering awareness
of unawareness.
The choice-theoretic approach to unawareness or related issues is taken in Li (2008),
Ahn and Ergin (2010), Schipper (2013), Lehrer and Teper (2014), Kochov (2010), Walker
and Dietz (2011), Alon (2015), and Grant and Quiggin (2015). The former four are dis-
cussed in detail in Karni and Vierø (2013). Walter and Dietz (2011), Kochov (2010),
and Grant and Quiggin (2015) consider decision makers who are aware of their potential
unawareness, and are thus the papers closest related to the present paper.
Walker and Dietz (2011) take a choice theoretic approach to static choice under “con-
28
scious unawareness.” In their model, unawareness materializes in the form of coarse contin-
gencies (that is, their state space does not resolve all uncertainty). Their representation is
similar to Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji’s (2005) smooth ambiguity model. The model
of Walker and Dietz (2011) differs from ours in several respects: theirs is a static model
and thus does not consider the issue of updating when awareness increases, their approach
to modeling the state space differs from ours, and in their model a decision maker’s beliefs
are not represented by a single probability measure.
Kochov (2010) develops an axiomatic model of dynamic choice in which a decision
maker knows that her perception of the environment may be incomplete. This implies that
the decision maker’s beliefs are represented by a set of priors, and that as the decision
maker’s perception of the universe becomes more precise, the priors are updated according
to Bayes rule. Kochov’s work differs from ours in the way the state space and its evolution
are modeled, and in the representation of decision makers’ beliefs.
Grant and Quiggin (2015) model unawareness by augmenting a standard Savage state
space with a set of “surprise states”. They also augment the set of standard consequences,
which is an interval, by two unforeseen consequences, which are divided into two types: one
favorable which is better than any standard consequence, and one unfavorable, which is
worse than any standard consequence. Unforeseen consequences can only arise in surprise
states. Their representation can be interpreted as if the decision maker follows a two-stage
decision procedure, first categorizing each act as being subject to favorable, unfavorable,
or no surprises, and second ranking acts. All acts subject to favorable surprises are, by
assumption, better than all acts subject to no surprise, which are in turn better than all
acts subject to unfavorable surprises. Within each category, acts are evaluated according to
an expected uncertain utility (EUU) representation. Unlike Grant and Quiggin, we make
no assumptions about the nature of unforeseen consequences, rather the utility of the
unknown that we derive reflects how the decision maker ranks these consequences relative
to the existing consequences. Thus, in our model, an act which the decision maker views
as possibly leading to an unforeseen consequence need not be ranked extreme relative to
acts that she views as not leading to something unforeseen. Also, in our model, beliefs
over states determine how likely the decision maker views a particular act to reveal new
consequences, while in Grant and Quiggin the decision maker cannot quantify the likelihood
of surprise states.
Statistical theories of inductive inference have long wrestled with the problem of how to
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deal with the potential existence of unknown and unsuspected phenomena and how, once
such phenomena occur, to incorporate the new knowledge into the corpus of the decision
maker’s prior beliefs. Zabell (1992) describes a particular instance of this issue, known
as the sampling of species problem, involving repeated sampling which may result in an
observation whose existence was not suspected (e.g., a new species).22 “On the surface there
would appear to be no way of incorporating such new information into our system of beliefs,
other than starting from scratch and completely reassessing our subjective probabilities.
Coherence of old and new makes no sense here: there are no old beliefs for the new to
cohere with.” (Zabell [1992], p. 206). Zabell proceeds to detail a process, anticipated by
De Morgan, that accommodates situations in which the possible species to be observed is
not supposed to be known ahead of time.23
Despite the similarity of the objectives, and to some extent structure (think of repeated
sampling as different acts and observed species as consequences) the solution for the sam-
pling of species problem and the conclusion of our approach, dubbed ‘reverse Bayesianism’,
are quite distinct. Perhaps the most important distinction is the specification of the prior.
In the solution to the sampling of species problem, the prior is induced by exchangeability
applied to the distinguished class of random partitions. In other words, it is implied by
the stochastic structure of the problem and, as a result, loses its subjective flavor. For
instance, the De Morgan rule creates an additional category: “new species not yet ob-
served” and assigns it the probability (N+ t+1)−1, where N is the number of observations
and t the number of known species.24 By contrast, in ‘reverse Bayesianism’ the prior is a
representation of the decision maker’s subjective beliefs, which includes an assignment of
subjective probability to the event of observing an indescribable consequence. Moreover,
unlike our model of ‘reverse Bayesianism’, the solution to the sampling of species problem
neither requires, nor does it yield, a utility valuation of the newly observed species or of
the anticipated, yet indescribable, species.
22We are grateful to Teddy Seidenfeld for calling our attention to Zabell’s work.
23The process is based on the idea of exchangeability of random partitions and it yields a representation
theorem, a distinguished class of random partitions, and a rule of succession, describing the updated beliefs
following the discovery of new species.
24See Zabell (1992), p. 209.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(Sufficiency) Since ∆(F ) is a convex set and  satisfies (A.1) - (A.3), by the expected
utility theorem, there exists a real-valued function, V : F → R, such that  on ∆(F ) is
represented by expected utility: For all µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(F ),
µ  µ′ ⇔
∑
f∈F
µ(f)V (f) >
∑
f∈F
µ′(f)V (f) (16)
Moreover, V is unique up to positive linear transformation.
To show that V (f) =
∑
s∈CˆA
Ws(f(s)), fix f∗ ∈ F and, for each f ∈ F and s ∈ CˆA, let
fs = f{s}f∗ ∈ F be defined by: fs(s) = f(s) and fs(t) = f∗(t) if t 6= s.
Let | CˆA |= n. Consider the mixed conceivable acts, µ ∈ ∆(F ) that assigns probability
1/n to f and probability (n− 1) /n to f∗, and µ′ ∈ ∆(F ) that assigns probability 1/n to
each f s, s ∈ CˆA. Then, by the definition in (4), ϕ(µ) = ϕ(µ′). Thus, by (A.4), µ ∼ µ′. By
the representation in (16), the last indifference is equivalent to
1
n
V (f) +
n− 1
n
V (f∗) =
1
n
∑
s∈CˆA
V (fs). (17)
For each s ∈ CˆA, define Ws(·) : C → R as follows:25
Ws(c) = V (c{s}f∗)−
n− 1
n
V (f∗) ,
Thus, for f ∈ Fˆ , Ws(f(s)) = V (fs) − n−1n V (f∗). This implies that
∑
s∈CˆAWs(f(s)) =∑
s∈CˆA V (f
s)− (n− 1)V (f∗). Multiplying by 1/n on both sides together with (17) implies
that
V (f) =
∑
s∈CˆA
Ws(f(s)). (18)
Plugging (18) into (16), we get
µ  µ′ ⇔
∑
f∈F
µ(f)
∑
s∈CˆA
Ws(f(s)) >
∑
f∈F
µ′(f)
∑
s∈CˆA
Ws(f(s)). (19)
(Necessity) This is immediate.
25Recall that c denotes both the outcome c and the constant act whose payoff is c in every state.
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(Uniqueness) The uniqueness of {Ws}s∈CˆA follows from that of V. To see this, define
Wˆs(·) = bWs(·) + ds, b > 0, for all s ∈ CˆA. By definition, for all s ∈ CˆA and c ∈ C,
Wˆs(c) = b
[
V (c{s}f∗)− n−1n V (f∗)
]
+ ds. Hence,∑
s∈CˆA
Wˆs(f(s)) = b
∑
s∈CˆA
Ws(f(s)) +
∑
s∈CˆA
ds = bV (f) + d,
where d =
∑
s∈CˆA ds. Since V is unique up to positive linear transformation, Vˆ = bV + d
represents the same preferences as V . Hence, {Wˆs}s∈CˆA represents the same preferences
as {Ws}s∈CˆA . It is easy to show that Wˆs(c) = Vˆ (c{s}f∗)− n−1n Vˆ (f∗) . ♠
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
(Sufficiency) By (A.1) - (A.4) and Lemma 1, we have that for all µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(F ),
µ  µ′ ⇔
∑
f∈F
µ(f)
∑
s∈CˆA
Ws(f(s)) >
∑
f∈F
µ′(f)
∑
s∈CˆA
Ws(f(s)).
By definition (4), ∑
f∈F
µ(f)
∑
s∈CˆA
Ws(f(s)) =
∑
s∈CˆA
∑
c∈C
ϕs(µ)(c)Ws(c).
Fix a non-null s′ ∈ CˆA (that such s′ exists is an implication of (A.6)) and define, for
p ∈ ∆(C), U(p) = ∑c∈CWs′(c)p(c). By (A.5), for any p, q ∈ ∆(C),∑
c∈C
Ws′(c)p(c) >
∑
c∈C
Ws′(c)q(c)⇔
∑
c∈C
Ws(c)p(c) >
∑
c∈C
Ws(c)q(c)
for all non-null s ∈ CˆA.
Thus, standard arguments imply that
µ  µ′ ⇔
∑
s∈CˆA
U (ϕs(µ))pi(s) >
∑
s∈CˆA
U
(
ϕs(µ′)
)
pi(s),
where U is continuous, non-constant, affine, real-valued, and unique up to positive linear
transformations, and the the probability measure pi is unique and pi(s) = 0 if and only if s
is null. This completes the proof of (ii.a).
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For all f ∈ F , a result analogous to Lemma 1 holds for  on ∆(FCˆA\CA(f)). That is,
for all f ∈ F , and for all µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(FCˆA\CA(f)),
µ  µ′ ⇔
∑
g∈F
CˆA\CA (f)
µ(g)
∑
s∈CˆA
Ws(g(s)) >
∑
g∈F
CˆA\CA (f)
µ′(g)
∑
s∈CˆA
Ws(g(s)).
Furthermore, arguments analogous to those just used to prove (ii.a) serve to prove (ii.b).
In particular, fix f ∈ F . Then (A.5) implies that, for any pˆ, qˆ ∈ ∆(Cˆ) and, for all non-null
s, s′ ∈ CˆA \ CA∑
cˆ∈Cˆ
Ws′(cˆ)pˆ(cˆ) >
∑
cˆ∈Cˆ
Ws′(cˆ)qˆ(cˆ)⇔
∑
cˆ∈Cˆ
Ws(cˆ)pˆ(cˆ) >
∑
cˆ∈Cˆ
Ws(cˆ)qˆ(cˆ).
Hence, by (A.5), we have that for all µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(FCˆA\CA(f)),
µ  µ′ ⇔
∑
s∈CˆA\CA
U∗f (ϕs(µ))φ(s) >
∑
s∈CˆA\CA
U∗f
(
ϕs(µ′)
)
φ(s),
where U∗f is continuous, non-constant, affine, real-valued, and unique up to positive linear
transformations, and the probability measure φ is unique, and φ (s) = 0 if and only if s is
null. This completes the proof of (ii.b).
(Necessity) The proof that (ii.a) and (ii.b) imply (A.1)-(A.6) on the respective do-
mains is straightforward. Since ∪f∈FFCˆA\CA(f) = F ∗ and FCˆA\CA(f)) ∩ F 6= ∅ for all
f ∈ F , the axioms necessarily hold on all of ∆(F ∗).
(Uniqueness) Follows from standard arguments. ♠
6.3 Proof of Theorem 1
(Sufficiency) We give the part of the proof that does not follow directly from Proposition
1. The representations (6) and (7) imply that, for all f ∈ F and for all p, q ∈ ∆(C),
pCˆA\CAf  qCˆA\CAf if and only if U∗f (p) > U∗f (q) . Hence, with appropriate normalization,
for all p ∈ ∆(C), U∗f (p) = U (p) , for all f ∈ F. Therefore, U∗f (p) is independent of f .
Suppose that c∗  x  c∗, let pˆ = αc∗ + (1− α) c∗ be such that pˆCˆA\CAf ∼ xCˆA\CAf .
By representation (7), this is equivalent to U∗f (pˆ) = U
∗
f (x). Then, by axiom (A.7) and
representation (7) we have that U∗g (pˆ) = U∗g (x), for all g ∈ F . But U∗f (pˆ) = U∗f (x) is
equivalent to
U∗f (x) = αU (c
∗) + (1− α)U (c∗) ,
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and U∗g (pˆ) = U∗g (x) is equivalent to
U∗g (x) = αU (c
∗) + (1− α)U (c∗) .
Hence, U∗f (x) = U
∗
g (x) := u (x) , for all f, g ∈ F .
Suppose instead that x < c∗  c∗, and let pˆ = αx+ (1− α) c∗ be such that pˆCˆA\CAf ∼
c∗
CˆA\CAf . By representation (7), this is equivalent to U
∗
f (pˆ) = U
∗
f (c
∗). Then, by axiom (A.7)
and representation (7) we have that U∗g (pˆ) = U∗g (c∗) for all g ∈ F . But U∗f (pˆ) = U∗f (c∗) is
equivalent to
αU∗f (x) + (1− α)U(c∗) = U(c∗),
and U∗g (pˆ) = U∗g (x) is equivalent to
αU∗g (x) + (1− α)U(c∗) = U(c∗).
Solving for U∗f (x) and U
∗
g (x) we get,
U∗f (x) = U
∗
g (x) =
U(c∗)− U(c∗)
α
+ U(c∗) := u(x)
for all f, g ∈ F .
Finally, if c∗  c∗ < x let pˆ = αc∗ + (1− α)x such that pˆCˆA\CAf ∼ c∗CˆA\CAf then, by
the same argument,
u∗f (x) = u
∗
g(x) =
U(c∗)− αU(c∗)
1− α := u(x)
for all f, g ∈ F .
It follows that U∗(pˆ) =
∑
c∈C pˆ(c)U(c) + pˆ(x)u(x), for all pˆ ∈ ∆(Cˆ).
The uniqueness of the subjective probabilities is implied by the uniqueness of the sub-
jective probabilities in Proposition 1.26
(Necessity) The necessity of axioms (A.1) - (A.6) follows from Proposition 1. The
necessity of (A.7) is immediate. ♠
6.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Necessity is immediate. We shall prove sufficiency.
26The uniqueness of pi in conjunction with Proposition 1 imply that φ(s) = pi(s)/pi(CˆA \ CA), for all
s ∈ CˆA \ CA.
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Suppose that (i) holds. The representations (11) and (12) are implied by Proposition 1.
By (11) and (12), the restriction of 0 and 1 to the mixed conceivable acts in ∆(C0) whose
support is the subset of constant conceivable acts in F0, implies that, for any p, q ∈ ∆(C0),
U0(p) > U0(q) if and only if p 0 q and that U1(p) > U1(q) if and only if p 1 q. By (A.8),
p 0 q if and only if p 1 q. Thus, by the uniqueness of the representations, U0 and U1 can
be chosen so that U0 = U1 on ∆(C0).
To prove (13), let λ, µ ∈ ∆(F0(h;E)), and λ′, µ′ ∈ ∆(F1(h′;E)) be as in (A.9). By
definition of the functions ϕi, ϕ0s(λ) = ϕ
0
s(µ), for all s ∈ CˆA0 \ E and ϕ1s(λ′) = ϕ1s(µ′), for
all s ∈ CˆA1 \ E. Hence, λ ∼0 µ if and only if∑
s∈E
pi0(s)
[
U(ϕ0s(λ))− U(ϕ0s(µ))
]
= 0 (20)
and λ′ ∼1 µ′ if and only if∑
s∈E
pi1(s)
[
U(ϕ1s(λ
′))− U(ϕ1s(µ′))
]
= 0. (21)
Axiom (A.9) together with (20) and (21) imply that∑
s∈E
pi0(s)
pi0(E)
[
U(ϕ0s(λ))− U(ϕ0s(µ))
]
=
∑
s∈E
pi1(s)
pi1(E)
[
U(ϕ1s(λ
′))− U(ϕ1s(µ′))
]
. (22)
By the hypothesis of axiom (A.9) (that is, λ = λ′ and µ = µ′ on E) and the definition of
the functions ϕi, for all s ∈ E, ϕ0s (λ) = ϕ1s (λ′) and ϕ0s (µ) = ϕ1s (µ′) . Hence, for all s ∈ E,
U(ϕ0s (λ)) = U(ϕ
1
s (λ
′)) and U(ϕ0s (µ)) = U(ϕ1s (µ′)). Thus, by (22),∑
s∈E
[
pi0(s)
pi0 (E)
− pi1(s)
pi1 (E)
] [
U(ϕ0s (λ))− U
(
ϕ0s (µ)
)]
= 0. (23)
The last equation implies (13). 27
27To see this, let E = {s, s′} ⊂ CA0 , such that, U
`
ϕ0s (λ)
´ − U `ϕ0s (µ)´ = A > 0, U `ϕ0s′ (λ)´ −
U
`
ϕ0s′ (µ)
´
:= B < 0, and U
`
ϕ0s′′ (λ)
´
= U
`
ϕ0s′′ (µ)
´
, for all s′′ ∈ CA0 \E. Then, by (23),»
pi0(s)
pi0 (s) + pi0 (s′)
− pi1(s)
pi1 (s) + pi1 (s′)
–
A+
»
pi0(s
′)
pi0 (s) + pi0 (s′)
− pi1(s
′)
pi1 (s) + pi1 (s′)
–
B = 0. (24)
But
pi0(s
′)
pi0 (s) + pi0 (s′)
= 1− pi0(s)
pi0 (s) + pi0 (s′)
and
pi1(s
′)
pi1 (s) + pi1 (s′)
= 1− pi1(s)
pi1 (s) + pi1 (s′)
. (25)
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To prove (14), let λ, µ ∈ ∆(F0(h;E)) and λ′, µ′ ∈ ∆(F1(CˆA0 , h′;E′(E))) be as in (A.10).
Then, ϕs(λ) = ϕs(µ), for all s ∈ CˆA0 \E and ϕs(λ′) = ϕs(µ′), for all s ∈ CˆA1 \E′(E). Hence,
by Theorem 1, λ ∼0 µ if and only if∑
s∈E
pi0(s)
pi0(E)
[U(ϕs(λ))− U (ϕs(µ))] = 0
and λ′ ∼1 µ′ if and only if∑
s∈E
pi1(E(s))
pi1 (E′(E))
[
U(ϕs(λ′))− U
(
ϕs(µ′)
)]
= 0.
By the hypothesis of axiom (A.10), for all s ∈ E, ϕsˆ (λ′) = ϕs(λ) and ϕsˆ(µ′) = ϕs(µ), for
all sˆ ∈ E(s). Hence, U(ϕs(λ)) = U(ϕsˆ(λ′)) and U(ϕs(µ)) = U(ϕsˆ(µ′)), for all sˆ ∈ E(s).
Thus, ∑
s∈E
[
pi0(s)
pi0(E)
− pi1(E(s))
pi1 (E′(E))
]
[U(ϕs(λ))− U (ϕs(µ))] = 0.
By the same argument as in footnote 27, the last equation implies (14).
The uniqueness is an implication of the uniqueness in Proposition 1. ♠
6.5 Proof of Theorem 3
(Sufficiency) That the axioms imply existence of a representation as in Theorem 2 follows
from the proof of Theorem 2. Let λ, µ ∈ ∆(F0) and λ′, µ′ ∈ ∆(F1) be as in Axiom (A.11).
Suppose that µ ∼0 λ. But µ ∼0 λ if and only if
c∗CA0 c
∗ ∼0 ηc∗ + (1− η) c∗. (30)
Substituting we obtain»
pi0(s
′)
pi0 (s) + pi0 (s′)
− pi1(s
′)
pi1 (s) + pi1 (s′)
–
= −
»
pi0(s)
pi0 (s) + pi0 (s′)
− pi1(s)
pi1 (s) + pi1 (s′)
–
. (26)
Hence, (24) reduces to »
pi0(s)
pi0 (s) + pi0 (s′)
− pi1(s)
pi1 (s) + pi1 (s′)
–
(A−B) = 0. (27)
But A−B > 0. Therefore, it must be that
pi0(s)
pi1(s)
=
pi0 (s) + pi0 (s
′)
pi1 (s) + pi1 (s′)
. (28)
Thus,
pi0(s)
pi1(s)
=
pi0(s
′)
pi1(s′)
. (29)
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By the representation in (11) the last indifference holds if and only if
U0 (c∗)pi0(CA0 ) + U0 (c
∗)
(
1− pi0(CA0 )
)
= U0 (c∗) η + U0 (c∗) (1− η) . (31)
But, U0 (c∗) > U0 (c∗). Hence, (31) holds if and only if
η = pi0(CA0 ). (32)
By Axiom (A.11), µ ∼0 λ implies that λ′ <1 µ′, which is equivalent to
ηc∗ + (1− η) c∗ <1 c∗CA1 c
∗. (33)
By the representation in (12), (33) holds if and only if
U1 (c∗) η + U1 (c∗) (1− η) ≥ U1 (c∗)pi1(CA1 ) + U1 (c∗)
(
1− pi1(CA1 )
)
. (34)
Hence, by the same argument as above, (34) holds if and only if
pi1(CA1 ) ≥ η. (35)
By (32) and (35) we have that
pi1(CA1 ) ≥ pi0(CA0 ), (36)
which is equivalent to pi1(CˆA1 \ CA1 ) ≤ pi0(CˆA0 \ CA0 ). The inequality in (36) is strict if and
only if λ′ 1 µ′ in Axiom (A.11), and holds with equality if and only if λ′ ∼1 µ′ in Axiom
(A.11).
(Necessity) The necessity of axioms (A.1) - (A.10) follows from the proof of Theorem
2. To show that (A.11) holds, let µ, λ ∈ ∆(F0) and µ′, λ′ ∈ ∆(F1) be as in (A.11). By (11),
µ ∼0 λ if and only if
U0 (c∗)pi0(CA0 ) + U0 (c
∗)
(
1− pi0(CA0 )
)
= U0 (c∗) η + U0 (c∗) (1− η) . (37)
Since U0 (c∗) > U0 (c∗), (37) holds if and only if
η = pi0(CA0 ). (38)
Suppose now that µ′ 1 λ′. By (12), µ′ 1 λ′ if and only if
U1 (c∗)pi1(CA1 ) + U1 (c
∗)
(
1− pi1(CA1 )
)
> U1 (c∗) η + U1 (c∗) (1− η) .
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Since U0 (c∗) > U0 (c∗), this holds if and only
pi1(CA1 ) < η. (39)
Now, expressions (38) and (39) imply that
pi0(CA0 ) > pi1(C
A
1 ). (40)
However, by (15), pi0(CA0 ) ≤ pi1(CA1 ), which contradicts (40). ♠
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